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Abstract 
To counteract global species decline, modern biodiversity conservation engages in large 
projects, spends billions of dollars and engages many organizations working simultaneously 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
within regions. To add to this complexity, the conservation sector has hierarchical structure, 
where conservation actions are often outsourced by funders (foundations, government, etc.) 
to local organizations that work on-the-ground. In contrast, conservation science usually 
assumes that a single organization makes resource allocation decisions. This discrepancy 
calls for theory to understand how the expected biodiversity outcomes change when 
interactions between organizations are accounted for. Here, we used a game theoretic model 
to explore how biodiversity outcomes are affected by vertical and horizontal interactions 
between three conservation organizations: a funder that outsourced its actions, and two local 
conservation organizations that work on-the-ground. Interactions between the organizations 
changed the spending decisions made by individual organizations, and thereby the magnitude 
and direction of the conservation benefits. We showed that funders would struggle to 
incentivize recipient organizations with set priorities to perform desired actions, even when 
they control substantial amounts of the funding and employ common contracting approaches 
to enhance outcomes. Instead, biodiversity outcomes depended on priority alignment across 
the organizations. Conservation outcomes for the funder were improved by strategic 
interactions when organizational priorities were well aligned, but decreased when priorities 
were misaligned. Meanwhile, local organizations had improved outcomes regardless of 
alignment due to additional funding in the system. Given that conservation often involves the 
aggregate actions of multiple organizations with different objectives, strategic interactions 
between organizations need to be considered if we are to predict possible outcomes of 
conservation programs or costs of achieving conservation targets. 
 
 
Introduction 
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Billions of dollars are spent yearly on biodiversity conservation but the continuing species 
loss  indicates that there is still a shortfall (e.g., McCarthy et al. 2012). In response, 
conservation science identifies cost-effective approaches to biodiversity protection (e.g. 
Murdoch et al. 2010; Venter et al. 2014). However, most studies assume that a single 
organization decides to spend and then undertakes a conservation project to attain its 
objectives (Blom 2004; Polasky et al. 2008; Ando and Mallory 2012, and many others). In 
contrast, conservation projects commonly involve multiple organizations and actions are 
often outsourced by funders to local organizations. This fact has not attracted much attention 
in conservation science because the organizations are often non-profits with parallel 
objectives. However, recent theory has highlighted the potential for interactions between 
organizations to influence the quantity and character of conservation outcomes, even if they 
are pursuing similar goals (Albers et al. 2008; Bode et al. 2011; Punt et al. 2012; Gordon et 
al. 2013). Understanding such influences is critical for conservation scientists who engage in 
conservation prioritization. It is also important for practitioners, who are very much aware 
that interactions among organizations in the conservation sector influence biodiversity 
outcomes, but do not necessarily have the theory or tools to predict their effects. 
Most conservation landscapes contain multiple organizations, as do many public-good sectors 
(Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997). Economic theory suggests that the number of conservation 
organizations in a region is a balance between the vast number that would be observed if 
there were no transaction costs and organizations specialized different conservation needs, 
and the reduced number that results from coordination among agencies for cost effectiveness 
(Economides and Rose-Ackerman 1993, Albers and Ando 2003). This expectation is 
supported by data that shows that many conservation organizations are found in a region 
(Armsworth et al. 2012), and they interact to promote outcomes and act at different scales 
(Mills et al. 2014). 
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To pursue their individual objectives, conservation organizations interact to varying degrees, 
from complete independence, through to merging to address the same objectives (Bates 
2005). Variation in objectives include differences in target species for conservation (e.g., 
birds vs. whales), approach (education, policy, land acquisition, etc.), or region (e.g., 
international vs. local). Organizations strategically interact as they compete for limited 
funding and each organization’s actions affect outcomes for the others. These interactions can 
be horizontal, as when equivalent organizations submit competing applications for funding. 
They can also be vertical, as when a funder outsources a project to an organization that can 
implement it. The result is conservation outcomes that promote both individual and shared 
conservation priorities (Macdonald 2002; Kark et al. 2009; Labich et al. 2013, etc.).  
One example of multiple organizations strategically working together s is the Greater 
Cumberlands Deal in Tennessee, USA. Completed in 2007, this 52 600 hectare project 
involved state and federal government agencies, and two private companies partnering with 
The Nature Conservancy. The project provided fee-simple additions to existing state parks, a 
new wildlife management area, and a conservation easement on a large forest tract owned by 
two conservation forestry companies (investment firms that manage forest lands for multiple 
objectives including ecological conservation). This configuration of five or more 
organizations —  with some providing funding and some doing on-the-ground conservation 
work — is common for large conservation deals and is very different from the assumed single 
decision maker.   
The theoretical literature has recently begun to consider the presence and impacts of multiple 
conservation organizations by using game theory (Albers and Ando 2003; Bode et al. 2011). 
Following precedents in this literature, we examine multiple conservation organizations, each 
pursuing their own goals. We extend on past writings by considering the role of large scale 
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funders and recognizing that conservation organizations must compete for the funders’ 
support. This formulation has similarities to a principal-agent problem in other economic 
settings because one organization can only obtain its objective by outsourcing action to 
another organization with slightly different objectives (Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  We examine how the strategic choices of a given configuration of organizations 
influence the biodiversity protected by a funder's investment by studying common 
configurations of conservation funding and action that are potentially misrepresented by a 
single player assumption.  
Modeling approach 
To examine the consequences of funders outsourcing conservation action to local 
organizations, we needed a modeled system with several characteristics. First, the model 
required organizations with similar, but not identical, objectives. Second, resources needed to 
be limited, so that competition arose in response to constrained outcomes. Finally, the 
conservation sector required both vertical and horizontal structure: the organizations that 
controlled the funding would not implement the conservation action themselves. This basic 
set of characteristics was as general and flexible a representation of multiple organization 
conservation as we could construct.  
Model formulation 
Figure 1 illustrates our model. Here, the conservation objectives of two land trusts were 
related to the priorities of the funder and each other (dashed lines in Fig. 1). Land trust 1 had 
a set of priority species (S1) that it aimed to protect (circles in Fig. 1), perhaps bird species 
found in a watershed. Land trust 2 also had a set of priority species (S2), found in a different 
location. This could be general wildlife conservation in a different watershed. These types of 
differing objectives are common across land trusts within a region (Foti and Jacbos 1989; 
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Chang 2011). The funder also had a set of prioritized species (SF). For instance, these could 
be species that provided ecosystem services in the downstream river valley system. Each land 
trust worked to protect species in their individual focal regions (1 and 2), but there was some 
overlap of species across regions (Γ1F, ΓF2, Γ12; subscripts indicate overlapping regions). 
Conservation organizations receive funding from multiple sources with differing restrictions 
placed upon its use. Game theoretic principles have been productively used to study the 
structure and dynamics of other sectors of the economy (Gibbons 1992; Coleman 1985; 
Hotelling 1970) and non-governmental sectors (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997) so we used 
them to define the system. For simplicity, we assumed each land trust had two types of 
funding to allocate to conservation projects; unrestricted internal funding that could be 
allocated to any project (bi) and potentially restricted funding provided by the funder. To 
simplify the model and aid interpretability, we assumed each land trust had only two options 
when it came to allocating funding. They could either invest in projects in their own preferred 
region (e.g. priority region 1 for land trust 1) or they could invest in projects in the region 
preferred by the funder. By investing in funder priorities they could protect some of their 
species due to the species overlap, but could also supplement their unrestricted internal 
budget by attracting additional investment from the funder. The funder considered allocation 
by the land trusts (p1, p2), for instance by estimating allocations across past projects, or from 
allocations detailed in public documentation, and then distributed a proportion (pF) of its 
funds in response to the decisions of the land trusts. The outcome was therefore determined 
by three budget allocation choices: each land trust decided what proportion (pi) of their total 
budget (βi) to allocate toward funder priorities, with the remainder spent in their own region, 
and the funder decided what proportion (pF) of its budget (βF) to give to land trust 1, with the 
remainder going to land trust 2. Each organization maximized the number of its species 
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protected by choosing its budget allocation (pi) while considering the budget allocation 
choices of the other agencies. 
max 
𝑝𝑖
𝑆𝑖(𝑝𝐹, 𝑝1, 𝑝2) 
We assumed that no organization would change its conservation objective during the funding 
round, that no land trust could spend in more than two regions, and that each organization’s 
entire budget was spent.  
A proportion of each focal region's species list (Si) was protected according to the species 
area relationship (SAR) and funding (piβi) allocated to the region. We scaled each 
organization’s possible budget to the amount of money that it would take to protect their 
entire region. Thus area protected is equivalent to available budget.  
𝑆 = 𝑐𝐴𝑧 
We used the SAR for simplicity, but other relationships between spending and conservation 
outcome would also be appropriate benefit functions. We scaled each organization’s possible 
budget to the amount of money necessary to protect their entire region. Thus area protected is 
equivalent to available budget. Each organization’s benefit was the sum of the species 
protected by spending on land conservation in their own region, plus the number of species 
protected by spending in regions where there was priority overlap, minus double counted 
species (see Supplementary Information for details). We used z = 0.25 to represent 
conservation landscapes (Pimm et al. 1995), although resource allocation is rarely affected by 
its precise value (Bode et al. 2009).  The constant c dropped out in all calculations. We also 
calculated the total number of species protected across all regions, and the number of species 
protected if there was only a single organization working in a region.  
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These model dynamics allowed us to examine the biodiversity implications of linked strategic 
decisions. To illustrate the calculations, consider the situation where the funder decided to 
allocate 20% of its budget to land trust 1 (pF = 0.2) and 80% to land trust 2, and the land 
trusts each spent 50% of their entire budget on funder priorities (p1 and p2 = 0.5). In our 
model, each organization’s total budget is enough to purchase 10% of their priority region to 
represent the resources of a midsize conservation organization. Thus, with these allocations, 
0.06 % of region 1 (0.5*(0.2*0.1 +0.1)), 0.15 % of region F, and 0.09 % of region 2 would be 
protected. If there was a 50% overlap in species lists between the regions, land trust 1 would 
be able to protect the number of species in its region that are protected with that amount of 
area (depends on SAR parameters) plus about 50% of the species in the area protected in the 
funders region (subtracting a small number due to double counting, see Supplementary 
information for details). The benefit to the other organizations was calculated similarly.  
Below we explain how we used game theory to identify the likely budget allocation choices 
of the organizations. 
Solution methods 
The species maximization functions above describe the benefit that each organization will 
receive from a chosen budget allocation, given the choices of the other organizations. 
Simultaneously solving the three functions for the unknown variables pF, p1 and p2, provides 
pF*, p1*, and p2*; the location(s) where the benefit functions intersect. This solution satisfies 
the Nash equilibrium condition where no organization could improve its benefit by 
unilaterally changing its funding allocation strategy. The Nash equilibrium gives the expected 
behaviour of three rational actors because any organization would achieve worse outcomes 
by altering its choice. We  focus on the Nash equilibrium because it is commonly used to 
study the strategic decisions of rational actors (Morris 1994).  
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We numerically identified the equilibrium conditions by calculating reaction surfaces (the 
optimal choice of one organisation given the choices of the others) for each organization and 
then identifying the choice sets where the three organizations’ reaction surfaces intersect. We 
modelled 5% increments of budget allocation between 0 and 1, to balance a smooth 
representation of the decision space and computational demands.  The intersection of the 
reaction surfaces in three dimensional decision space describes the Nash equilibrium 
conditions.  
We have illustrated this approach in two dimensions (Fig. 2). For any choice that Player 1 
makes, Player 2 has a best choice it can make, here plotted with the dashed line. Meanwhile, 
for any choice that Player 2 makes, Player 1 has a best choice as shown by the thick line. An 
iterative method for identifying intersections (Krawczyk and Uryasev 2000; Contreras et al. 
2004) is illustrated by the thin line. The method is based on the Nikaido-Isoda function 
(Nikaido and Isoda 1955) and implemented in Matlab (R2014a, Mathworks). Player 2 makes 
an initial choice indicated by the small circle. Player 1 makes their optimal response (a point 
on the reaction surface, line 1), and then Player 2 optimally re-assesses their decision. The 
choices alternate between players (lines 2-5), and eventually converge at the Nash 
equilibrium (the intersection of the curves)  where neither player can unilaterally improve 
their decision (large circle). In our model each organization has a reaction surface in three 
dimensions.  We randomized starting points and the first mover choice for the relaxation 
algorithm and used repeated runs to identify the Nash equilibrium (convergence to Nash 
equilibrium occurred 82-95 % of runs depending on parameter and first mover choice). The 
number of species protected by each organization at the Nash equilibrium set of choices is the 
expected solution of the multiplayer game.  
 Illustrative examples: 
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We analyze this basic model framework using common conservation organization priority 
configurations. These examples were chosen to explore how conservation benefit changes 
due to strategic interactions between organizations. 
1) High priority alignment 
Funding allocation decisions would appear straightforward when the priorities of funders and 
recipients are closely aligned. For example, external funders (e.g, a foundation) often 
outsource biodiversity protection by providing grants to local conservation organizations with 
similar priorities (Gunter 2004; Emerton et al. 2006; McBryde and Stein 2011). This funding 
model is commonly used by land trusts that aim to maintain greenspace (McQueen and 
McMahon 2003; Hopper and Cook 2004). For example, the Open Space Institute in New 
York State provides funding to land trusts in the Appalachian and Cumberland regions of the 
US through their Southern Cumberland Land Protection Fund (David Ray, Open Space 
Institute Conservation Capital and Research Program, personal communication). The institute 
funds fee simple acquisition or easement purchases (Kilpatric et al. 2004) within focal areas 
identified in their “Protecting Southern Appalachian Wildlife” study. Local land trusts in the 
focal regions apply for matching funding to support projects that meet predetermined 
conservation criteria, particularly land acquisition projects that allow for climate change 
adaptation of species within the region. The funding recipients all pursue land conservation in 
their region, and although they also have other objectives, climate change adaptation may be 
a significant shared objective (David Ray, personal communication). Current recipients of 
this funding include the Land Trust for Tennessee, The Tennessee Parks and Greenways 
Foundation, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, The Nature Conservancy — Alabama 
Chapter, and The Nature Conservancy —Tennessee Chapter.  
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To reproduce the essential elements of these dynamics, organizations in our first example 
have a high priority alignment of 50 % (Γ1F = ΓF2 = Γ12 = 0.5). We assumed that each of the 
three organizations had enough funding to each protect 10% of their region of interest (βF = 
b1 = b2 = 0.1). The funder could therefore double the budget of one land trust or allocate the 
money across both land trusts. 
We calculated the Nash Equilibrium to predict the combined choices of rational organizations 
for this example, and then studied the benefit accruing to each organization. There were two 
Nash Equilibria: (p1, p2, pF) = (0.12, 0, 1) or (0, 0.12, 0), indicating that only one of the land 
trusts would allocate efforts towards funder priorities, and even then only a small amount. 
The two equilibria were symmetric, since the land trusts were identical. Essentially, the first 
land trust willing to spend any resources in the funder's priority region received the funder’s 
full budget. At this point, the other land trust was unwilling to compete, and chose to focus on 
its own region. These results are robust to variation around our specific parameter choices: 
neither land trust could ultimately secure additional benefit by offering to spend more than a 
small proportion of its total budget on the funder's priorities.  In this high overlap scenario the 
funder was able to protect about 70% of its priority species (Fig. 3a) and one local land trust 
received additional investment from the funder (LT2 in Fig. 3a) and protected about 80% of 
its species. The other land trust received no investment from the funder and protected about 
76% of its species. In comparison, any organization working on its own could expect to 
protect about 56% of its priority species, and 75% of all species were protected.  These 
proportions depend on the parameters of the species area relationship underlying our benefit 
function, but it is important to note that all organizations benefited from the presence of other 
organizations compared to if they were working with only their budget.  
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The equilibrium solution constrains local spending on funder priorities to a minimal amount, 
despite the funder's attempt to incentivize the land trusts to compete for its funding, and the 
high overlap between the funder and land trust objectives. The funder would maximize 
protection of its species if it could induce a land trust to spend its entire budget on the 
funder's priorities. However, that is counter to either land trust's best strategy because they 
each also want to maximize spending on species they care about. Thus, the land trusts 
focused on their own priorities and only spent on funder priorities in relation to their potential 
gain due to overlap.  
2) Low priority alignment 
We next examined the case where the priorities of the funder and the land trusts were 
minimally aligned. Minimal overlap in organizational priorities is not uncommon in 
conservation deals. Biodiversity has a large number of facets, often with very low spatial 
congruence (Orme et al. 2005). Moreover, conservation projects often include partners with 
different organizational priorities. For instance, in 2010, The Nature Conservancy's Australia 
Program orchestrated the Fish River Station conservation project in the Northern Territory 
(Fitzsimons and Looker 2012). This 180,000 ha property was acquired because The Nature 
Conservancy guaranteed some of the purchase funding but also coordinated other funding 
sources and partners to enable the Indigenous Land Corporation to buy the site with the intent 
of eventual transfer to the indigenous Traditional Owners. Indigenous Land Corporation is a 
national government-established corporation with an objective to assist indigenous people in 
acquiring land, but it does not primarily focus on biodiversity conservation. For this project, 
the Australian Government provided two-thirds of the purchase price. The Nature 
Conservancy provided one-sixth, and the remainder came from the Pew Charitable Trust via 
an agreement with Greening Australia and Indigenous Land Corporation. Thus, significant 
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biodiversity outcomes were a result of coordinated efforts by organizations with minimal 
institutional priority alignment. 
To model the minimal alignment scenario, we set the objective overlap between the funder 
and the land trusts to 10% (Γ1F = ΓF2 = Γ12 = 0.1), while holding all other model parameters 
as previously. The resulting Nash equilibrium for the three organizations, (p1, p2, pF) = (0.05, 
0, 1) and (0, 0.05, 0), showed that the land trusts were even less willing to compete for the 
funds than in the high overlap scenario. The low competition negatively impacted the funder 
which was only able to protect about 31% of its priority species (Fig. 3a), lower than in the 
high alignment scenario (70%), and lower even than if it undertook action itself (56%). 
Meanwhile, one land trust was able to double its budget (land trust 2 in Fig. 3a) and protect 
69% of its species. This was substantially more than it could have achieved with its own 
budget (56%), but less than if there was high priority alignment across the organizations 
(80%). The land trust that received no additional funding (land trust 1 in Fig. 3a) was able to 
protect 60% of its species, with species gains due to the small overlap in priority species with 
the funder, and 51% of the species in the region were protected.  
Important dynamics can be observed in the way land trusts respond to the amount of priority 
overlap. The two land trusts had an incentive to spend a  minimal amount on the funder's 
objectives because of the level of overlap, and the strategies available to the funder could not 
persuade the land trusts to spend more (within a cost/benefit target for the funder. See 
discussion below). Because the local land trusts acted in their own self-interest and could not 
out-compete each other, only the amount of priority overlap determined the benefit that the 
funder receives. For this study we focused on two levels of priority overlap, but benefit 
scaled with overlap across the players (Supplementary figure S2).  
Using contracts to encourage investment in funder priorities 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
The land trusts obtained benefit from funder investment into the region even without directly 
receiving the funding. First, spending by the other land trust on funder priorities protected 
some species due to overlap (1.2% more species), and second, the land trust shifted what it 
otherwise had spent on the funder's priorities towards its own priorities instead (0.7% more 
species).  In our case, the small gain that a land trust obtained by shifting its spending 
corresponded with a crowding out loss of approximately 1% of benefit for the funder. This 
crowding out is a theoretically predicted response of conservation organizations to additional 
investment  (Abrams and Schitz 1978; Steinberg 1991), particularly noticeable when private 
land trusts shift investment in response to governmental acquisition (Albers et al. 2008; 
Parker and Thurman 2011).  
We briefly explored some common contracting strategies for counteracting the effects of 
misalignment between funder priorities and local spending. One strategy was for the funder 
to contractually obligate the land trusts to spend contributed money only on the funder’s 
priorities (we call this the “Request for Proposals” (RFP) strategy). This strategy increases 
the spending on funder priorities as compared to the equilibrium case, but was subject to 
crowding out. To understand the dynamics, we compared the RFP strategy with the outcomes 
if the funder did not spend in the system. When the funding organization offered no budget 
(βF = 0), one of the land trusts would nevertheless allocate a small increment of its budget to 
the funder's priorities (p1, or p2 = 0.02). This was because the land trusts received diminishing 
marginal returns with increasing investment in their own region, so after a point they can do 
better by investing elsewhere (i.e. the funder’s region),  even if that other location had a 
lower proportion of their species. The funder therefore obtained protection for some of its 
species, even though it made no investment. However, once the funder demanded that the 
effort was applied to its priorities (RFP strategy Fig. 3b), neither land trust would choose to 
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allocate anything further because allocation towards the funder’s region had already 
experienced diminished marginal returns.  
Cost-sharing is another strategy to counteract crowding out that requires a land trust to 
commit some of its own budget to receive grant money (Fig. 3b). We modeled cost sharing 
by requiring  that any grant funding (pF) had to be matched by some increment of spending 
on funder priorities by the land trust  (formulation details in Supplementary Information). 
This cost sharing requirement incrementally improved the funder's benefit, but only 
counteracted crowding out if the match amount was larger than the available budget. The 
funder’s best option  was to offer a 20:1 match which, for our parameterization, would 
protect a tenth of a percent less species than the scenario with crowding out. Here, the amount 
necessary to counteract the crowding out merely replaced the shifted funding, and the cost 
share did not incentivize the land trusts to behave differently.   
The funder's inability to incentivize land trust behavior could result from the funder being 
constrained to spend its entire budget. We examined how the ratio of the benefit  to the cost  
varied with funder budget. The funder's willingness to spend its entire budget in the system 
depended on the benefit to cost ratio it was willing to accept. For our example budget level 
(βF = 0.1), the funder would be willing to contribute the entire amount for any non-zero 
benefit to cost ratio of return  (Figure 4).  
Discussion 
Current estimates of global conservation funding need rely on theory that ignores multiplayer 
interactions. We asked how strategic interactions between a given configuration of 
organizations influenced the biodiversity conservation obtained from spending. Our results 
suggested that the projected  funding necessary to reduce biodiversity loss (e.g. McCarthy et 
al. 2012; Waldron et al. 2013; Tear et al. 2014; Venter et al. 2014) may be misestimates of 
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actual need. This is because interactions between the organizations change the decisions 
made by individual organizations and the overall conservation benefit that can be achieved 
for a given budget. Because conservation organizations have different objectives, the 
necessary funding could be much higher than anticipated. Importantly, we found that a funder 
would struggle to incentivize recipient organizations to perform desired actions, even when it 
controls substantial amounts of funding and relies on common contracting approaches. 
It was surprising that the conservation funder could not incentivize land trust behavior 
because, since both land trusts would benefit from additional funding, we expected that their 
competition for funding would benefit the funder‘s objectives. This effect may be observed if 
the local organizations chose to compete for funding by adjusting their allocation towards 
funder priorities. In our model, because the two land trusts had similar budgets and potential 
benefits and neither could outbid the other in competing for the funder's investment, they 
were indifferent between competing for funding or simply pursuing their own objectives. 
Accordingly, the budget incentive could not influence the land trusts to change their behavior 
and increase the funder's gain.  We were documenting the general dynamics so we  examined 
the simplified case with symmetric overlap across the three organizations. However, an 
interesting line of future research would be to  look at asymmetric cases or more 
organizations. 
The effectiveness of a funder's spending was highly dependent on its priority alignment with 
the local land trusts. With high priority alignment, greater biodiversity outcomes of the 
funders’ spending result from multiple organizations acting strategically. However, with low 
priority alignment, the funding organization's spending effectiveness was decreased by 
strategic interactions between multiple organizations. This information could prove valuable 
if funders can identify high-alignment subsets of trusts to negotiate with. However, gauging 
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priority alignment is difficult in practice (Gronbjerg et al. 2000), particularly when 
conservation objectives are multidimensional and not explicitly stated. Our discussions with 
funders suggest that conservation inefficiencies can be minimized by contracting with 
organizations that focus on a tight mission and have a demonstrated history of overlap on 
desired objectives.  A fruitful avenue for further study might therefore be to identify a 
heuristic for deciding how the funder should act given varied overlap. 
Caveats and assumptions 
A primary simplifying assumption of our model is that each organization pursues funding 
that supports it conservation objective and does not change its  objectives during the funding 
round..  An alternative formulation could allow organizations to revisit their objectives to 
better position themselves for funding. This mission drift (Jones 2007) would move land 
trusts away from their original priorities towards those of the funder. The result could be 
more closely aligned with the priorities (and implicitly, the beliefs and values) of broader 
society, as represented by the pooled conservation resources. Non-profit organizations could 
also choose to split their resources between both sets of objectives rather than pursuing a 
compromise objective with all available resources (Steinberg 1986; Hewitt and Brown 2000; 
Brooks 2005).  
We use the species area relationship to relate conservation spending to biodiversity outcomes. 
However, other benefit functions (e.g., relationship between ecosystem services, or 
population persistence, and spending) also would be appropriate. The benefit obtained by 
each organization depends on the value of the z parameter, but a sensitivity test suggested 
that all players would obtain at least some benefit for any value of z (Supplementary Figure 
S1).  
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We also note that the effectiveness of conservation spending is perspective dependent. For 
this study, we examined scenarios from the perspective of a conservation funder that was 
working towards a conservation outcome that it perceived to be important. However, the 
relative effectiveness of different strategies varies if you considered the outcome from the 
perspective of other organizations.  
Conservation implications 
Conservation professionals need to consider the influence of interactions between multiple 
players when they estimate what a conservation program could achieve. Meanwhile, 
conservation planners need to design projects and resource allocation strategies in a way that 
acknowledges the role of such interactions. These suggestions are based on our representation 
of conservation projects as a noncooperative game with multiple players, a modeling 
approach little used in conservation studies. Our formulation recognizes explicitly that the 
biodiversity outcomes for both recipient and funding organizations are subject to the actions 
of other organizations in the system. Taken together, these recommendations reiterate this 
study’s primary message for policy makers and planners: insights from studies that assume a 
single decision maker may not translate well to on-the-ground conservation with its multiple 
players.  
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Figure 1:  Conceptual model of multiplayer system with the flow of funding represented by 
solid arrows and the objectives of the organizations represented by dashed arrows. The 
funding organization has an objective to protect species in region F but does not have any on-
the-ground operations of its own. It obtains a conservation benefit by supplementing the 
budgets (b) of land trusts that work in the region. These land trusts decide what proportion 
(p1, p2) of their total budget (β) to allocate toward funder priorities in order to incentivize the 
regional conservation organization's decision of how to proportionally allocate its budget 
(pF). Species (S) are protected according to the spending in each region, but there is some 
overlap (Γ) across the different organizations' priority species. 
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Figure 2: Simplified illustration of how reaction curves (surfaces) can be used to identify the 
Nash equilibrium. Here the axes represent each player’s choice — which for our problem is 
how much of their budget they will spend on funder priorities. The dashed curve is Player 2's 
best choice for any choice made by Player 1. The solid curve is Player 1's set of best choices. 
The thin line shows the iterative method for identifying the Nash equilibrium (large circle) 
from any starting player's choice (small circle). 
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Figure 3: Nash equilibrium benefit per organization and in total, when there is low objective 
alignment (black bars, Γ = 0.1) or high alignment (white bars, Γ = 0.5). In a), the grey bar 
indicates the benefit the funder would obtain from this budget if it could engage in on-the-
ground projects by itself, and b) shows funder benefit across different investment strategies. 
None is when the funder does not invest at all but existing spending in the system protects 
some of its focal species. ``Request for Proposals'' (RFP) represents when the land trusts are 
contractually obligated to spend contributed funding on funder priorities. The two cost share 
(CS) scenarios illustrate funder benefit when the funder invests 10 and 20 times the land trust 
investment in the region. 
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Figure 4: This figure illustrates the results of our sensitivity test exploring the funder 
benefit/cost ratio across the budget allocation scenarios we tested. It suggests that, although 
the expected gain decreases as the proportional spend on the project increases, the funder will 
continue to invest in a region if it is satisfied with any positive gain. 
 
 
